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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In response to Daniel Straub's challenge to the district court's award of wrongful 
death damages as restitution in his criminal case, the State makes two primary 
responses. First, the State asserts that Mr. Straub's claims on appeal are not properly 
justiciable by this Court because this challenge was waived by his underlying guilty 
plea. Second, the State claims that the district court's award of restitution was proper. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, given a proper reading of the waiver 
contained within Mr. Straub's guilty plea agreement, the district court's unlawful award 
of restitution was not encompassed within the prospective waiver in this agreement. 
Additionally, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the State's argument 
on appeal, the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to the right to a jury 
determination under Article I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution is in no way resolved 
by whether a statute would purport to permit the issue to be heard the district court 
alone. While Mr. Straub continues to vigorously dispute the State's claim that the 
district court's award of wrongful death damages is authorized by statute, this 
contention is irrelevant in any event, as the Idaho State Constitutional guarantee of a 
right to jury trial would trump any statutory provision that would purport to remove or 
diminish this right. 
Finally, the State asserts that the wrongful death damages award under the guise 
of restitution in this case is authorized by I.C. § 19-5304. While Mr. Straub continues to 
vigorously assert that the State's claim is without legal merit, he will rely on the 
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arguments previously contained within his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those 
same arguments herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Straub's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it entered a restitution award against 
Mr. Straub in the amount of $554,506.67? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Entered A Criminal Restitution Order 
Against Mr. Straub In The Amount Of $554,506.67 
A. Mr. Straub's Challenge On Appeal To The District Court's Award Of Restitution In 
This Case Was Not Waived Under The Terms Of His Plea Agreement, And Is 
Therefore Properly Justiciable By This Court 
The State has asserted on appeal that Mr. Straub's challenges to the restitution 
order in his case are not reviewable on appeal, claiming that they have been waived in 
light of Mr. Straub's underlying plea agreement. However, a review of the totality of this 
plea agreement, along with pertinent standards governing the interpretation of waivers 
of rights within plea agreements, reveals this argument to be without merit. 
Plea agreements, being contractual in nature, are generally interpreted by this 
Court in accordance with contract law principles. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 
267, 270 (Ct. App. 2006). This includes review for whether the terms of the contract are 
ambiguous. When the language in a plea agreement is ambiguous, this Court will hold 
any ambiguity against the State and in favor of the defendant. State v. Peterson, 148 
Idaho 593, 595 (2010). As held by the Peterson Court: 
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendant. "As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are 
occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear 
responsibility for any lack of clarity.'" "[A]mbiguities are construed in favor 
of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding 
also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant 
to plead guilty." 
Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). "When interpreting a 
term of a contract, this Court is obligated to view the entire agreement as a whole to 
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discern the parties' intentions." Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, 148 
Idaho 638, 640 (2010). 
In this case, the State bases its argument that Mr. Straub waived his right to 
appeal from an unlawful restitution order by the district court on the following language 
from Mr. Straub's guilty plea: 
By accepting this offer the Defendant waived the right to appeal any 
issues regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or 
sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all suppression 
issues. 
(R., p.110; Respondent's Brief, pp.7-12.) 
Nothing in this waiver indicated whether it would cover prospective rulings by 
the district court on matters other than sentencing. (R., p.110.) As was noted by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Mosqueda, restitution proceedings are not part of a 
defendant's sentence, but are rather separate civil proceedings, and therefore any 
waiver of rights specific to Mr. Straub's sentence would not encompass his right to 
appeal from the district court's restitution order in his case. See State v. Mosqueda, 
150 Idaho 830, 833-834 (Ct. App. 2010). Therefore, because the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has determined that the district court's restitution order is part of, "a civil 
proceeding distinct from a criminal case," as was held in Mosqueda, any waiver of rights 
as to Mr. Straub's criminal offense or sentencing cannot be imputed to the district 
court's subsequent restitution order. Id. 
In addition, a review of the entire record of the plea agreement in this case 
reveals that the parties specifically contemplated and bargained for only lawful 
restitution - i.e. that authorized by statute, and therefore this specific agreement as to 
restitution would be controlling over any other general term. Specific or special 
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provisions control over more general ones where both may be read to relate to the 
same subject matter. See, e.g., Barr Development Inc. v. Utah Mortg. Loan Corp., 106 
Idaho 46, 48 (1983); Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 518-519 
(1948). 
The issue of restitution was a term of the plea agreement that was specifically 
bargained for by the parties, and it was expressly limited to only that restitution that was 
authorized by statute. (R., p.110.) Because the parties specifically bargained for only 
that restitution which is authorized by statute, any restitution order that exceeded this 
bargained-for term was not within the parties' contemplation at the time of entering the 
plea agreement. As such, this order should not be held to be encompassed within 
Mr. Straub's waiver of appellate rights, as any such order could not have been part of a 
knowing or voluntary waiver on Mr. Straub's part. This is in accord with the holdings of 
numerous other jurisdictions that have declined to enforce a waiver of appellate rights 
with regard to prospective rulings that are outside the expectations or contemplated 
events of the parties. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(applying narrow interpretation of waiver of appellate rights, and construing waiver 
against the State in finding that defendant's appeal was properly justiciable); U.S. V. 
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that a waiver of the right to 
appeal would not prevent an appeal where the sentence imposed is not in accordance 
with the negotiated agreement); Williams V. State, 37 S.W.3d 137, 139-140 (Tex. Ct. 
App.2001). 
For this same reason, Mr. Straub's purported waiver - at least, under the State's 
interpretation, could not have been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and 
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therefore any waiver of the right to challenge the unlawful restitution order is without 
legal effect. "Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the 
accused knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and 
that he intentionally chose to forego them." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
237 (1973). While a party may prospectively waive rights on appeal, such a waiver 
must be, "an intentional relinquishment of a known right," - which has been held to 
require that the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See McCarthy v. U.S., 
394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Any waiver contained within a plea agreement that cannot 
meet this standard violates due process and will be held void. Id. By the terms of 
Mr. Straub's plea agreement, the district court was limited to only award restitution that 
was actually authorized by statute. Mr. Straub never intentionally relinquished his rights 
to only be subject to lawful restitution - in fact, he expressly reserved them. As such, 
the finding of a waiver of his right to challenge an unlawful restitution order - which is 
the interpretation of the plea agreement urged by the State - would not comport with 
due process, and therefore would be void. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Murphy, largely relied upon by the 
State in this appeal, actually supports this conclusion. See State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 
456, 456-457 (1994) (see also Respondent's Brief, pp.7-B.) The Murphy Court notes 
that waivers of the right to appeal can be valid in Idaho - but only if these waivers can 
be demonstrated to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. Central to the finding of a 
voluntary waiver of the appellate rights in Murphy was the fact that there was no 
question or ambiguity regarding the scope of the defendant's waiver of appellate rights, 
and that the defendant, "knew full well the consequences of waiving his right to appeal 
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the judgment and sentence." Id. at 457. Given this, the record affirmatively 
demonstrated a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal the 
specific issues later presented to the appellate court. 
Here, in contrast, the record indicates that Mr. Straub could only have reasonably 
anticipated an award of restitution within statutory limits. He could not have been said 
to know "full well" that the district court would award over one-half million dollars in 
wrongful death damages under the guise of criminal restitution. 
And, despite the State's assertions otherwise, this case falls within the ambit of 
the holding in State v. Holdaway, which dealt with an appellate waiver that did not 
specifically waive post-judgment rulings. See State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 484 
(Ct. App. 1997). In Holdaway, the defendant waived his right to appeal from his 
judgment of conviction and sentence. Id. at 483-484. However, the language in the 
waiver of appellate rights did not expressly subsume post-judgment rulings by the 
district court. Id. Because post-judgment rulings were not expressly contained within 
the waiver of appellate rights in Holdaway, the court rejected the State's suggestion that 
the issues on appeal were not properly justiciable. Id. This Court should do the same. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, there is no unambiguous waiver of Mr. Straub's 
right to challenge on appeal the district court's restitution award in this case. At the very 
least, the failure of the waiver of appellate rights in Mr. Straub's case to make any 
mention of prospective rulings that he could not be expected to anticipate (i.e. an 
unlawful restitution award) coupled with the parties' apparent mutual expectation that 
only lawful restitution would be awarded, renders the waiver in this case, at the very 
least, ambiguous as to Mr. Straub's appellate rights regarding the district court's 
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ultimate restitution order. As previously noted, any ambiguity with regard to plea 
agreements are strictly construed against the State and in the defendant's favor. 
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595-596. Under such an interpretation, and further in light of the 
pertinent standards for waivers contained within a guilty plea, the appellate waiver in 
Mr. Straub's case does not preclude his current challenge on appeal to the district 
court's unlawful restitution order. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Straub's Right To A Jury Trial Under Article 1, § 7 
Of The Idaho State Constitution When The District Court Tried The Issue Of 
Whether Ms. Webster Was Entitled To Wrongful Death Damages Without First 
Obtaining A Valid Waiver Of Mr. Straub's Right To A Jury Determination On This 
Issue 
In response to Mr. Straub's claim that he had a constitutional right, under Article 
I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution, to a jury determination as to any award of wrongful 
death damages, the State makes only one narrow response. The State argues that, 
because (in the State's view) wrongful death damages are subsumed in the restitution 
statute which does not provide for a jury determination, there can be no right to a jury 
trial under the Idaho State Constitution. This claim is without merit. 
As an initial matter, one key concession made by the State is critical to this issue. 
The State concedes that the damages awarded as restitution by the district court in this 
case, "are recoverable in a civil wrongful death action." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) And 
the State never disputes the fact that actions to recover this type of damages carried 
with it the guarantee of the right to a jury trial at the time of the adoption of the Idaho 
State Constitution. (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) These two facts, taken together, 
demonstrate Mr. Straub had a right under the Idaho State Constitution to a jury 
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determination as to any purported award of wrongful death damages - regardless of the 
label attached to such an award. 
It is of no accord whether the restitution statute would purport to eliminate the 
right to a jury determination. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has deemed those 
portions of a statute that purported to eliminate the right to a jury trial to be 
unconstitutional and a nullity where the Idaho State Constitution provides for the right to 
a jury trial for such actions. See Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Free, 126 Idaho 
422, 424-427 (1994). Because this is the State's sole contention on appeal, and 
because this assertion is irrelevant to the issue of whether Mr. Straub had a 
constitutional right to a jury determination regarding the award of any wrongful death 
damages, the State's claim that Mr. Straub was not entitled to a jury determination is 
with out merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Straub respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying Mr. Straub's motion for reconsideration of the restitution order in this case, 
vacate the restitution order, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2011. 
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